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The rule of reason approach should be used when applying the Sherman Act
to foreign commerce because many problems arise that are unknown in
domestic commerce. In this manner proper consideration could be given
to the relevant market and to the reasonableness of a restraint in light of
foreign business conditions. The Declaratory Judgment Act could be used in
such cases to determine whether a proposed course of action is legal. If any
or all of these suggestions were adopted, the uncertainty surrounding the
application of the Sherman Act to foreign commerce would be reduced, and
American business could, through private investment, help promote the
economic development of the CACM.
WVILLIANI M.

LEDERER

SELECTED ANTITRUST PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISOR:
EXCLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS, TERRITORIAL RESTRICTIONS,
AND FRANCHISE TERMINATION
Although the modern franchise agreement had its genesis more than one
hundred years ago,' it has only recently become a significant factor within
the domestic economy. Franchised business operations now account for approximately ten per cent of the gross national product 2 and almost twentyfive per cent of all retail sales. 3 In 1967 there were approximately 750 "substantial" franchising operations with a total of 450,000 retail outlets. 4 That
franchising is a relatively recent phenomenon is evidenced by the fact that
prior to 1966 the Small Business Administration (SBA) refused to classify
as small businesses those that were not free from the outside control of a
relatively large concern. Since the right to some control over the franchisee
is a crucial element in virtually all franchise agreements, the SBA amended
its small business size standards to provide that the presence of such control
would not preclude the small businessman from receiving SBA benefits if he
were otherwise qualified.2
1.

H.

KURSH, THE FRANCHISE BooMt 4-5 (rev. ed. 1968).

2. Senator Philip A. Hart, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly Legislation, estimates that franchising now accounts for $80 billion of business
each year. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., April 15, 1969, at A-17.
3. Zeidman, The Growth and Importance of Franchising -Its Impact on Small Business,
12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1191, 1196 (1967). Senator Hart estimates that franchising involves 20%
of all retail sales, supra note 2.
4. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 1196; New York Times, July 9, 1967, §3, at 1, col. 1.
5. 13 G.F.R. 121.3-2(a) (Supp. 1969), first published in 31 Fed. Reg. 11973 (1966):
"[R]estraints imposed on a franchisee by its franchise agreement shall not be considered
in determining whether the franchisor controls . . . and, therefore, is affiliated with the
franchisee, if the franchisee has the right to profit . . . and bears the risk of loss ....
.
See Zeidman, Small Business Concerns - Franchising and Its Antitrust Problems, 29 ALA.
LAW. 460, 462 (1968).
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The term "franchise" embraces an amalgam of marketing or manufacturing concepts or both.6 However, there are certain common characteristics
that serve to illustrate the basic nature of franchise agreements. A franchise,
in its simplest terms, is a contract permitting the franchisee to distribute goods
or services either produced by the franchisor or embraced within a trademark held by the franchisor. Although franchise agreements can be categorized
primarily by the subject matter of the franchise, numerous ancillary provisions,
which can be inserted into the franchise contract, preclude a more precise
definition. Typically these provisions relate to such matters as the nature
of the franchised product or concept and whether the franchisor shall offer
continuing assistance to the franchisee, provide training for the franchisee,
and sell equipment to the franchisde.7 Although other classifications have
been suggested for various franchise arrangements" it seems most suitable,
for the purposes of antitrust analysis, to classify franchise systems according
to the nature of the subject of the franchise. Considered in such a manner,
almost all franchise agreements fall within one of three categories: 9 first,
those that establish an efficient method of distribution for the franchisor's
product; 10 second, those that establish retail outlets where a franchisor is
principally selling a name or method or format of doing business;1 and third,
those franchise arrangements that establish manufacturing or processing
plants.1 2 Each of these types of franchises is formed with a different objective
in mind; each faces distinct business problems; and each poses different antitrust issues that, when resolved, are not necessarily applicable to the other
13
types of agreements.
The origins of the "franchise boom" can be found in the economic and
social climate of the period immediately following the Second World War.
Returning veterans, backed by business loans guaranteed by the Veteran's
Administration, 4 provided the capital and managerial potential necessary to
make the franchising concept viable. With the evolution of suburban shopping districts and the perfection of national advertising media in the form

6.

Kintner, Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements-As Viewed By a Mem-

ber of the Private Bar, 12 ANrrpusr BULL. 1211, 1213 (1967), notes the virtually useless
breadth of the term.
7. H. Kuasai, supra note 1, at 24.
8.

LeBlanc, Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and Franchising,53 TRADE-

REP. 519, 520 (1963), distinguishes between franchising of manufactured goods and
franchising of a product concept; Kintner supra note 6, at 1213, distinguishes between
manufacturers and retailers, manufacturers and wholesalers, wholesalers and retailers, and
service-sponsors and retailers.
9. Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NoTR DAME:
LAw. 605, 606-07 (1967).
10. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Interphoto Corp. v.
Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
11. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125
(1965); Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan, 1962).
12. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
13. Kintner, supra note 6, at 1214.
14. H. KuRSH, supra note 1, at 6,
MARK
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of television and radio, 15 the stage was set for a new form of business enterprise geared to the demands of an affluent and mobile society.
The 1946 amendments to the Lanham Trademark Act", were the catalytic
factors in the ascendancy of franchising. Prior to these amendments, the
owner of a trademark had the exclusive right to its use only in the geographical area in which he could reasonably be expected to employ the mark.'- The
amended registration provision conferred on the registrant of the mark
national rights that were much more generous than many trade symbol
registrants themselves were able to utilize.' 8 Since the 1946 amendments, the
tremendous expansion in trade symbol licensing has been paralleled by a
related increase in the use of franchising as a marketing technique.' 9 Other
factors inherent in franchising also have contributed substantially to its
success. Competitive unitary systems could not be established with the same
capital and personnel requirements within so short a time; 20 nor could a
unitary marketing or production system generate the managerial enthusiasm
found in a franchised operation where each unit was operated and owned by
2
the same individual. 1
As franchising has attained an increasingly significant role in the American economy, it has come under intensifying scrutiny from the federal antitrust laws. This confrontation has been ultimately defined in terms of the
degree of control that the franchisor may exercise over the franchisee. For
the franchisor control is the key element of the entire system. Without standardization - which can only be implemented by the franchisor - there is no
selling point that can be successfully exploited. 22 In addition to controls on
the nature and quality of the end product of the franchise agreement, the
franchisor may also seek to control the geographic area in which, and the
persons with whom, the franchisee may deal.3 Because of the breadth of the
15. Zeidman, supra note 3, at 1192.
16. 15 U.S.C. §1072 (1964) provides that "[r]egistration of a mark on the principal
register provided by this chapter . . . shall be constructive notice of the registrant's claim
of ownership thereof."
17. This was the doctrine of concurrent territorial trade symbol rights. See United
Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918); Hanover Star Milling Co. v.
Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916); Dole, The Interplay of Trade Symbol Protection and the
Antitrust Laws, 13 ANTITRusr BULL, 1347, 1350 (1968).
18. Dole, note 17 supra.
19. Id.
20. Covey, supra note 9, at 607.
21. Covey, supra note 9, at 607; Zeidman, supra note 3, at 1210. Additional factors,
which have been suggested as relevant to the expansion of franchising, include flexibility
of individualized operation when compared with the bureaucratic ineptness of larger corporations, Shuman, The Future of Franchisingand Trade Regulation, 14 HOWARD L.J. 60, 74
(1968), and the widespread technological revolution of the fifties such as the uniform governmental grading of food products throughout the nation.
22. Covey, supra note 9, at 608. Cf. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
Just when and in what manner this standardization should be implemented by the franchisor is, however, unclear. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in
FranchisingArrangements, 116 U. PA. L. REx'. 435, 453 (1968).
23. Wilson, Exclusionary Restraints and Franchise Distribution, 12 ANTrr~Usr BULL.
1169, 1169-70 (1967). See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
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possible range of control, legitimate concern has been expressed that franchising might "deteriorate into a thinly veiled system of total control over
all the essential business decisions that the franchisee is supposed to make
24
on his own."
This concern for the welfare of the small businessman has served as the
core of the Supreme Court's rationale in construing the antitrust laws in
franchise cases.2 . One commentator noted after the now renowned decision
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 2 6 that the Court "would appear
to be evolving a doctrine which embraces the freedom of an individual businessman to conduct his business as he sees fit, and which sees as illegal attempts on the part of other businessmen to curtail that freedom unduly."27
However, another critic has commented that such a formulation is more
conducive to ruining than running a franchised operation. 28 Schwinn and
other of the Court's decisions emphasizing the importance of the small
businessman are, however, particularly confusing when applied to franchising cases. For example, under the facts of the Schwinn decision, it is
somewhat unclear whether the manufacturer becomes the small businessman
of the case when he is contrasted against his competitors, Sears and Montgomery Ward, 0 or whether the small businessmen are actually the retail and
wholesale dealers who should then be contrasted with the much larger and
more powerful Schwinr manufacturing organization.31 Whether the franchisee
or the franchisor is the small businessman, antitrust policy is to that extent
indeterminate.
The duality of the franchisee's interest further obscures this area. The
relative dominance of the franchisor over the franchisee becomes a source
of antitrust concern when one considers that the franchisee owes allegiance
both to his own interests and to those of the franchisor. The individual in
the unitary system does not have a bona fide interest apart from that of the

24. Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchising and the Role of the Law, 12
ANrrrusr BuLt.. 717, 726 (1967).
25. White Motor Co. v. United States 372 U.S. 253, 264 (1963); see United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 369-70 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962); cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 380 (1967).
See Zeidman, supra note 5, at 460. However, others have countered that in spite of this
language, the antitrust laws have in essence failed because they have not attacked the
really large concentrations of economic power, but have only interfered with those that
are medium-sized. John Kenneth Galbraith expressed this as "the element of charade in
the antitrust laws." Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Select Comm. on Small
Business, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. at 7 (1967). Donald F. Turner, in The Scope of Antitrust and
Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82 HARv. L. Ruv. 1207, 1213 (1969), criticized Galbraith's position, and suggested thrusts through which the antitrust laws could become a
more effective instrument.
26. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). See text accompanying note 157 et seq. infra for an analysis
of the Schwinn decision.
27. Jones, supra note 24, at 741.
28. Zeidman, supranote 5, at 482.
29. See cases cited note 25 supra.
30. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 334 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
31. See United States v. Arnold, Schwinn. & Co,, 388 U.S,. 65, 368-69 (1967).
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integrated system;3 2 he is an employee. The franchisee on the other hand, is
more nearly in the position of an independent businessman. With tying
arrangements, that is, conditioning the sale of a sought after product upon
the purchase of an accompanying, unrelated product, the point seems to be
well taken. Other forms of restraint, such as territorial and customer allocations, may be of benefit to both the franchisor and franchisee, and perhaps
in some cases even of more benefit to the franchisee33 Central to the interaction of franchising and the antitrust laws is the element of control. The importance of establishing a mutually amenable balance between the competing
3
interests of the franchisee and franchisor is of considerable importance. 4
[I]f the attributes of a franchisee's independence - his pride and
initiative, his industry and concern for the future of the business are lost, the problems for the franchisor of supervision and control
and of discipline and morale may at this point far outweigh the advantages of conservation of capital and decentralization which the
franchise system ideally promises. Moreover, if the franchisee's genuine
legitimate independence is lost, his role in our economy as a decisionmaker, his imagination as an innovator, the speed with which he can
react to and meet whatever the local market and the particular competitive conditions may there require, and his own competitive potentiality will similarly become a nullity.
The focus of this note will be upon the problem of control in terms of
decisional and statutory law with a view toward determining the permissible
limits within which the franchisor may accomplish his business goals. For
purposes of this analysis, the restraints normally employed in franchising
shall be classified as exclusive arrangements, customer and territorial restrictions, and termination provisions. Consideration will be given to the special
quality control problems encountered with a trademarked product or process,
since such problems are particularly relevant in the "format" type franchise.
EXCLUSIVE ARRANGEMENTS

Exclusive arrangements encompass those restraints that are commonly
termed exclusive dealing and tying arrangements. Although exclusive dealing
can be further subdivided into exclusive selling and exclusive buying, the
former category will not be discussed in this section since its effect is primarily
territorial3

The proof required to establish that the use of these various methods of
control amounts to a violation of the antitrust laws varies considerably 6s
However, when dealing with these restrictions in a franchise context, one
32. Jones, supra note 24, at 727.
33. Jordan, Exclusive and Restrictive Sales Arcas Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REV. 111, 120 (1961).

34. Jones, supra note 24, at 725.
35. Covey, sup-ra note 9, at 609. See also discussion at notes 138, 223 infra.
36. Compare Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (exclusive
dealing), with Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I (1958) (tying arrangements).
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should not for evidentiary purposes distinguish too readily between the restrictions. They should be considered together as a part of the same spectrum
of ideas because some actions, seemingly exclusive dealing arrangements defensible through a showing that the practices arise from and accomplish valid
business goals, will be treated as tying arrangements and subjected to a per
se standard of illegality that makes irrelevant any showing of justifications
for the restraints. 37 Such a possibility arises particularly in the franchise context because the power of termination of the franchise agreement is in itself
viewed as having possible antitrust consequences. A growing awareness of this
38
power and its impact was captured quite aptly in a Senate report:
From previous hearings held by the subcommittee, there was
testimony- although disputed by some-that because of restrictions
placed by some franchisors on franchisees, they may be something less
than independent businessmen. When these restrictions are coupled
with the threat of arbitrary cancellation the franchisor may be able
to control decisions of the franchisee with respect to pricing, purchasing,
and other competitive business decisions. The result may be that the
franchisee's ability to compete effectively in the marketplace is restricted.
This realization has had particular impact in the area of exclusive buying.
The courts have interpreted the franchisor's vested power of termination to
represent sufficient economic power to justify application of the harsh tying
standards of per se illegality to restraints that would normally39 encounter
the less rigorous exclusive dealing standard of the rule of reason.
Exclusive Buying
Exclusive buying agreements require that the franchisee purchase designated supplies only from the franchisor or from other sellers who have been
approved by the franchisor. 40 These arrangements, which generally appear
in the form of requirements contracts, are quite common in franchising"

37. Wilson, supra note 23, at 1175. See also Covey, supra note 9, at 613; Dillon, Exclusive Dealing, Requirements Contracts, Tieing Arrangements and Full-line Forcing, 37 ABA
ArNcrrusr L.J. 146, 150 (1968). Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958),
stated the rationale for the per se rule: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which
because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry
as to the precise harm they have caused or the business excuse for their use."
38.

SUBcOMM.

ON ANTTRuSr

AND MONOPOLY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

ANTTRUST AND MONOPOLY AcTvr=s 1967, S. REP. No. 1226, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1968).
39. Compare Standard Oil Co. of Cal. , Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S.
293 (1949), with FTC v. Texaco Co., 393 U.S. 223 (1968).
40. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). See Covey, supra note
9, at 609; Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising,17 STAN. L. REV. 926, 937

(1965).
41. E.g., Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125
(1965); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1962); Engbrecht
v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962).
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and generally are beneficial to both franchisee and franchisor. A dependable
source of supply with relatively stable costs constitutes the primary benefit to
the franchisee. In the absence of such factors, he is unable to implement
effective long-range planning and must additionally absorb the otherwise
unnecessary costs and risks of storage of those items that fluctuate in avail42

ability.

The franchisor is better able to establish and maintain goodwill by
creating a situation in which the franchisee stocks all of his products rather
than having a random selection. 43 Additionally, the franchisor can assure high
quality throughout his franchise system without incurring the relatively high
costs related to policing numerous independently supplied outlets. 4 4 Theo-

retically, the ultimate benefit to the consumer materializes in uniformly high
quality in a large array of goods that may be purchased at relatively low
costS.

45

Although the courts have traditionally viewed exclusive buying provisions
with suspicion, they have not yet held them to be per se violations of the
antitrust laws.46 This suspicion is manifested in the particular scrutiny given
to exclusive buying arrangements when the economic power of the seller far
exceeds that of the buyer.47 Because such an economic imbalance is typical
in franchising situations, the courts have treated exclusive arrangements
between franchisee and franchisor rather harshly while still applying the
rule of reason. In Standard Oil of California & Standard Stations v. United
States4 s the franchisor had required that the franchisees purchase all pe-

troleum from the franchisor. In some instances the franchisor also required
that purchases of tires, batteries, and accessories (TBA) be made through
the franchisor. Although the Supreme Court held these restrictions to be in
violation of section 3 of the Clayton Act,49 the focal point of the decision is its

emphasis on the economic consequences of the exclusive dealing provisions
employed by the franchisor. 5° Rejecting the per se approach espoused in International Salt Co. v. United States,51 the Court conducted a rule-of-reason
investigation of the arrangements52 before finding them to be illegal.

42. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949); Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 605, 609 (1967).
43. Covey, supra note 42, at 609; cf. FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
44. LeBlanc, Antitrust Ramifications of
TRADEMARK REP. 519, 540 (1963).

Trademark Licensing and Franchising, 53

45. Covey, supra note 42, at 609.
46. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 333 (1961); Anchor Serum
Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
47. Zeidman, Small Business Concerns - Franchisingand Its Antitrust Problemns, 29 ALA.
Law. 460, 473 (1968).

48.
49.
50.
(1949).
51.
52.

337 U.S. 293 (1949).
15 U.S.C. §14 (1964).
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 302
332 U.S. 392 (1947).
337 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1949).
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In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co.,53 a requirements contract
between a public utility and a small coal producer was upheld. The contract
would have been violative of the test announced in Standard Stations. The
Court in Tampa Electric based its decision partially upon a finding that there
was not a significant imbalance of economic power between the contracting
parties.54 In emphasizing the equality of the power possessed by the parties,
the Court in effect distinguished the case from virtually all franchising
situations. It has been suggested that Tampa Electric indicates an increased
willingness by the Court to acknowledge the significance of certain business
purposes for employing requirements contracts,5 5 thereby lessening but not
at all vitiating the "quantitative substantiality" criterion of Standard Stations.55 Others have pointed out that exclusive dealing arrangements may be
more justified in franchising situations where the franchisee operates under
the tradename of the franchisor. 57 In such instances the franchisor has an
interest, which is somewhat greater than that involved where the franchisee
does business under his own name, in overseeing the operation of the franchised enterprise. Accordingly, it is arguable that the standards applied in
such cases should make allowances for proof of a valid business justification
and lack of anticompetitive intent.5s
Such comments overlook the significance of the inevitable discrepancies
in economic power between franchisee and franchisor, an imbalance that cannot be ignored when attempting to determine the present viability of Standard Stations.59 When one considers the second requirements contract, which
dealt with TBA in addition to petroleum products, the impact of this imbalance on the threshold between rule of reason and per se illegality becomes
of considerable importance. Although the TBA requirements contract may
seem to be no more offensive than the contract that dealt with petroleum
products alone, it has less relevance than does the primary requirements
contract to the supposed benefits accruing from enjoying a guaranteed source
of supply at a stable price level. While the very existence of a service station
franchise requires that the franchisee have his basic product, gasoline, available on a continuing basis, his needs for TBA can be more easily satisfied
under a short-term or completely independent arrangement. Thus, the summary standard of per se illegality applied to tying arrangements might be
held applicable to a case with a factual situation similar to that in Standard
Stations. With this possibility in mind, an analysis of tying arrangements is
in order.
53. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
54. Id. at 330; Curly's Dairy, Inc. v. Dairy Co-op. Ass'n, 202 F. Supp. 481, 485 (D.

Ore. 1962).
55. Rudnick, The Franchisor's Dilemma: Can He Satisfy the Legal and Commercial
Requirements of a Trademark Licensing System Without Exposing Himself to Other Legal
Risks, 56 TRADEMARK REP. 621, 624 (1966).

56. Zeidman, supra note 47, at 474.
57. Covey, supra note 42, at 620-21; Dole, supra note 17, at 1357.
58. Dole, supra note 17, at 1357. See discussion at note 157 et seq. infra.
59. This was the problem of defining the threshold between exclusive dealing and
tying arrangements that was alluded to in the discussion, notes 37-39 supra.
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Tying Arrangements
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States,"° the Supreme Court suc-

cinctly defined tying arrangements:
[A] tying arrangement may be defined as an agreement by a party to
sell one product but only on the condition that the buyer also purchases
a different (or tied) product, or at least agrees that he will not purchase
that product from another supplier.
The traditional justification for tying devices in a franchise context is the
franchisor's need to assert an effective form of quality control over the franchisee in order to protect his established goodwill." Lower base costs for
both the franchisor and franchisee can be attributed to the use of tying
devices in those situations where the economies of scale achieved by the franchisor's purchasing are passed on to numerous franchisees. Furthermore, the
franchisor's expenses incurred in quality control are greatly reduced if he is
able to inspect supplies passing through a central depository rather than
having to make field checks on each individual franchisee. 62 In most instances
these savings will be passed on to the consuming public in the form of lower
prices and will therefore bolster the volume of sales in an item having an
elastic demand curve. 63 The consumer is additionally benefited by the product
improvement that a large-scale franchisor is able to accomplish. 64
Asserting that "tying agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the
suppression of competition,"65 the courts have consistently declared such
restraints to be illegal per se. 66 This condemnation is predicated largely upon
the realization that the paramount interest in the tying arrangements rests
with the franchisor-supplier, who receives the real benefits from the arrangement in the form of higher profits or rebates from his franchisees.67 Given
this motive for the use of a tying agreement, neither the consumer nor the
goodwill of the franchised product is benefited;68 the application of the per
se rule is therefore justified.
The creation of a per se rule does not always result in a per se condemnation of the practices proscribed by the rule. The Chief of the Division of
60. 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958); Note, supra note 40, at 928. A classic example of a tying
arrangement is found in IBM v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
61. Wilson, supra note 23, at 1173; Note, supra note 40, at 933.
62. Note, supra note 40, at 931, 933.
63. Id.
64. Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72 YALE
L.J. 1171, 1190, 1192 (1963). However, others have viewed these advantages as short-lived
and less beneficial to competition and the consuming public than the complete absence of
tying. Note, supra note 40, at 933-34.
65. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
(1949) (emphasis added).
66. See note 37 supra.
67. Note, supra note 40, at 928. If the alleged tying arrangement is such that no profits
accrue to the alleged violator, no violation of the antitrust laws results. Crawford Transp.
Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964).
68. Note, supra note 40, at 929.
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Trade Restraints- of the Federal Trade Commission has indicated that although the Commission is willing to apply a per se rule in this area, it will
nonetheless look for more than the mere presence of a tie-in arrangement.
Accordingly, he has suggested that attorneys come before the Commission
"with the best possible evidence of why the [challenged] restraints . .. advance the public interest in free, fair and open competition." 6 9 There are
several significant cases that collectively delineate those circumstances in which
the restraints can be said to serve such a public interest. In United States v.
Jerrold Electronics,70 the manufacturer refused to sell separately any selected
components of a recently developed community television antenna system.
It further refused to sell its product unless the purchaser agreed to purchase
the entire system, which included a service contract. The court approved the
limited use of a tie-in, noting that such was necessary to protect the goodwill
of an infant industry. In emphasizing that in a newly conceived industry
prompt and efficient service is necessary to foster and protect the industry's
71
goodwill, the court noted:
[A] wave of system failures at the start would have greatly retarded,
if not destroyed, this new industry and would have been disastrous for
Jerrold, who ...did not have a diversified business to fall back on
but had put most of its eggs in one precarious basket in an all out
effort to open up this new field.
However, the court further delineated this policy by noting that although
Jerrold's policy "was reasonable at its inception," it could no longer be sustained.72 The industry had lost its "infant" status and had, at the time of
trial, obtained its majority.
Jerrold is also relied upon for the proposition that tying is inapplicable
in some situations where there is actually only a "single product," that is, a
television antenna system, rather than a group of related but distinct products. 7 3 In Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corporation,74 the court interpreted
Jerrold as enumerating "four criteria of separability" to be used in determining whether the single product defense had been properly established. The
75
court noted that the following factors are of primary significance:
69. Jones, supra note 24, at 734 n.34; Wilson, supra note 23, at 1172, 1180.
70. 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
71. Id. at 557.
72. Id. at 558; Note, Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18 STAN. L. REv. 457 (1966). Cf. Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co..
v. SMC Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143, 156 (D. Md. 1968).
73. Note, supra note 72, at 559. See also International Mfg. Co. v. Landon, Inc., 336 F.2d
723, 730 (9th Cir. 1964); Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SMC Corp., 287 F. Supp. 143,

156 (D. Md. 1968).
74. 340 F.24 753 (6th Cir. 1965).
75. Id. at 764. This single product defense arose with a slightly different emphasis in
Dehydrating Process Co. v. A. 0. Smith Corp., 292 F.2d 653 (Ist Cir. 1961), where the manufacturer of a silo unloading device required that a glass-lined silo be purchased with the
unloader. Earlier abortive attempts to use the unloader with conventional silos had prompted
this alleged tying. Id. at 654, 656. Although the lack of any satisfactory substitutes in the
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the practices of competitors;
the number of products alleged to be a single product;
the method in which the purchaser was charged - for indiitems or for the unit; and
the consistency of prior practice with the presently alleged

A final defense to an allegation of an illegal tying arrangement can be invoked in those cases in which the specifications for the tied product are so
detailed that they cannot practically be made available to the purchaser.
However, this defense, which was suggested in the Standard Stations decision,
has not been very efficacious for the franchisor.76 In Teleflex Industrial Products, Inc. v. Brunswick Corporation,77 the court noted that even if "technological interdependence" was shown, the tie-in sale might nevertheless be proscribed if competing manufacturers could demonstrate that their instruments
could be readily conformed to the tying manufacturer's standards.78 Some commentators have questioned the ultimate validity of the specifications defense
even in cases where virtually unattainable specifications are shown. It is
maintained that even at such a point, the harm to competing sellers far outweighs the interest of the franchisor in assuring conformity to minute details.79

In Times Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,s° the Supreme Court
upheld a unitary sale of advertising in morning and evening newspapers even
though advertisers were compelled to purchase space in both papers, which
were owned by the same publishing company, in order to advertise in either
one. The Court was unable to determine which edition'should be termed the
dominant product in order to establish the tying of advertising in one paper
to purchasing advertising in the other. Furthermore, the Court failed to find
the power necessary to effect an illegal tying arrangement,8 1 although subsequent decisions in which power has been inferred from the existence of the
tying arrangement seem to be more in line with the Court's current philosophy
on this point.8 2 The relevant issue in the franchise context then becomes
whether the Court will infer the existence of the requisite power to render a
tying agreement illegal through the mere existence of a franchise agreement. 83
market very likely influenced the court's decision, the logical result of such absence is that
this silo-unloader combination was for all practical purposes a single product, two parts of
an integral system. Id. at 656-57. See also Covey, supra note 42, at 620; Zeidman, supra note
47, at 476.
76. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 306
(1949).
77. 293 F. Supp. 106 (E. D. Pa. 1968).
78. Id. at 110.
79. Note, supra note 40, at 928.
80. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
81. But see Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1957), which
said the result in Times-Picayune was based on a failure of proof. Cf. FTC v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 261 U.S. 463 (1923).
82. E.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
83. Wilson, Exclusionary Restraints and Franchise Distribution, 12 ANTITRuST BULL. 1169,
1175 (1967).
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In Standard Stations, discussed previously as it bears upon exclusive arrangements, 84 the Court placed strong emphasis on the desirability of a judicial consideration of the proffered business justifications. However, an examination of several recent franchising cases indicates a trend toward an
inference of the requisite power arising from the franchise itself. This trend
can be interpreted as classifying some activities as tying and therefore subject
to a per se condemnation.
In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,5 a sponsorship
of Goodyear TBA by Atlantic to its franchised retail outlets was held to be
in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.8 6 The Court
placed strong emphasis on Atlantic's active involvement in the plan because
Atlantic had urged its dealers to carry Goodyear products. Although the
Court expressly noted the challenged activity was not a tying arrangement, it
emphasized the economic power that Atlantic possessed over its dealers. This
control took the form of "lease and equipment loan contracts with . . .cancellation and short-term provisions.."87 The Court further noted that the
"central competitive characteristic [of the agreements] was the same" as in
tying arrangements.88
The Court had previously reached similar conclusions, 9 but with its decision in Federal Trade Commission v. Texaco9- the full import of this trend
became evident. In Texaco the Court looked only to the short-term leases and
other contractual manifestations of unequal bargaining power to find that an
arrangement similar to that of Atlantic Refining was "inherently coercive."
The Court expressly noted that Texaco did not employ the "overt coercive
practices" involved in Atlantic Refining.91 Texaco did not indicate that its
holding was the result of an application of a per se rule analogous to that
applied in most tying cases, but the proof of the violation does not seem to
amount to more than a showing of the existence of the practices alleged. This
is the typical impact of the application of a per se rule.9 2 Furthermore, Justice
Marshall's dissenting opinion in United States v. Container Corporation of
America93 indicates that the Texaco decision is an application of a new per
9
se rule. 4
84. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 302
(1949). See discussion at note 48 et seq. supra.
85. 381 U.S. 357 (1965), rehearingdenied, 382 U.S. 873. See also Shell Oil Co. v. FTC,
300 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1966); Broussard v. Socony Mobil Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346 (5th Cir. 1965).
86. 15 U.S.C. §45 (1964).
87. 381 U.S. 357, 368 (1965). Cf. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 21 (1964).
88. 381 U.S. 357, 368-69 (1965). See Wilson, supra note 83, at 1174-75; Zeidman, The
Growth and Importance of Franchising-ItsImpact on Small Business, 12 ANTrrRUsT BULL.
1191, 1203 (1967).
89. See generally Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964); Osborne v. Sinclair Ref.
Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963); United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 400
(7th Cir. 1941).
90. 393 U.S. 223, 89 S.Ct. 429 (1968).
91. Id. at 228, 89 S.Ct. at 432.
92. BNA ANrrusr & TADE RFe. RiEP., March 4, 1969, at B-2.
93. 393 U.S. 333, 89 S.Ct. 510 (1969).
94. Id. at 340, 89 S.Ct. at 514.
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A case somewhat analogous to Texaco is Federal Trade Commission v.
Brown Shoe Co.95 Rather than a situation of preexisting power over the
retailer-franchisee, Brown Shoe involved an offer dealing with certain valuable services- 6 to be provided by Brown to the dealer in return for the dealer's
agreement to concentrate his sales program upon Brown products. Brown
Shoe seems to encompass more than Texaco in finding a violation of section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA). Comparing the case with
Atlantic Refining, one commentator has suggested that the distinction is the
difference between employing a stick and a carrot to achieve desired goals.9 7
Although the Court was willing to find a violation of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, the case does not support the trend culminating in the
Texaco decision. The Brown Shoe language indicating that proof of economic
impact need not be shown9" was based upon the "incipient incipiency" application of section 5 of the FTCA. 99 Departing from the trend represented by
Atlantic Refining, the Court in Brown Shoe analyzed the anticompetitive factor in a manner reminiscent of the Tampa Electric approach to exclusive
dealing.10 Lest this analysis seem too encouraging for the potential franchisor,
it should be noted that the Texaco decision is the Court's latest pronouncement in this area. Furthermore, the relevance of Brown Shoe to the more
popular forms of franchising is open to some doubt 0 1
Thus, in attempting to solve the problem regarding the viability of the
secondary (TBA) exclusive arrangements in Standard Stations °- it would
seem justified (and even properly precautionary) to anticipate the application of a per se rule to such arrangements.
Finally, one should not hastily dismiss the foregoing cases as relevant to
the economic giants of our financial community but not to the moderately
large franchisor. In Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp., ° 3 the
Court was presented with an alleged tying arrangement foreclosing competition in the tied item to a maximum of 190,000 dollars annually. In holding
this arrangement illegal under the Sherman Act, the Court said that sufficient
competition had been foreclosed so as "not to be merely 'de minimus.' " By
thus lowering the threshold at which an impermissible amount of competition
is foreclosed, this case broadens the area in which tying arrangements will be
found illegal, and although the meaning of this phrase in a franchising context is uncertain, the increased possibility of liability in much smaller eco95.

384 U.S. 316 (1966). Cf. Bascom Launder Corp. v. Telecoin Corp., 204 F.2d 331,

333 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 994 (1953).
96.

384 U.S. 316, 318 (1966) listed the furnishing of architectural plans, merchandising

records, services of field representatives, and group insurance.
97. Covey, Franchising and the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NoTE

DAME

LAw. 605, 616 (1967).

98. 384 U.S. at 321-22.
99.

Dillon, Exclusive Dealing, Requirements Contracts, Tieing Arrangements and Full-

line Forcing,37 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 149 (1968).
100. Wilson, supra note 83, at 1177. See discussion note 53 et seq. supra.
101. Rudnick, supra note 55, at 626.
102. See the discussion note 59 supra.
103. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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nomic units than the Atlantic or Texaco oil combines cannot be ignored.
For the prospective franchisor, Fortner stands as a portentious omen.
And because Fortner was decided under the Sherman Act and not merely
section 5 of the FTCA, under which Atlantic, Texaco, and Brown Shoe were
decided, the franchisor is further liable for private treble damage suits.104
Trademarks and Tying
It has been noted that "[fjor many franchisors, the Texaco opinion may
mean that they can comply with the law only by avoiding any involvement
with their franchisees' purchases from third-party suppliers of products that
are not used in dose enough association with the franchised mark to make
restrictions on their source reasonably ancillary to protection of the mark." 105
There seems to be an unarticulated distinction between those franchise arrangements in which the franchisor agrees to permit the franchisee-licensee to
use the mark not only as a trademark but also as a trade name, and those in
which the owner licenses only the use of the mark and the franchisee continues to do business under his own trade name.1 00 This distinction assumes
some importance in an antitrust context, since the legality of employing certain restraints in these different methods of doing business may ultimately
turn upon whether the restraints are employed for anticompetitive purposes
or are ancillary to the licensing of the trademark and are accordingly employed
to protect the goodwill embodied in the mark. 07 Under the scrutiny of the
rule of reason, restraints employed in a trade name franchise are more likely
to be found to be reasonable than identical restraints where only the use
08
of the trademark is permitted.
From the consumer's point of view, trademarks serve two essential purposes: they reduce the risk in purchasing previously untried products, and
they assist in choice reduction when one is faced with a variety of similar
products. 09 Trademarks are said to enhance competition because they induce
individuals to enter production by giving them an opportunity to take advantage of another's (the licensor's) technological and marketing experi104. See, e.g., Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967), modified sub. nom., Chicken Delight v. Harris, 412 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1969), which also illustrates
the expanded usefulness of the class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23. Furthermore, the
point is now well settled that the franchisee is not barred from suing as being in pari
delicto with the franchisor. Konfakis v. Carvel, 1968 TRADE CAs. sf72,343, at 84,933 (E.D.N.Y.,
Jan. 5, 1968).
105. BNA ANTTRUST & TRADE RE. REP., March 4, 1969, at B-1.
106. See Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1963);
Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co., 203 F. Supp. 71.4 (D. Kan. 1962); United States v. SpringAir Co., 1962 TRADE CAs. ff70,402 (N.D. Ill. 1962). See also LeBlanc, supra note 44, at 536-37.
107. Baker v. Simmons Co., 307 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1962); Covey, supra note 97, at 621.
108. Covey, supra note 97, at 622; Kintner, Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements-As Viewed by a Member of the Private Bar, 12 ANTrrRusT BULL. 1211, 1217 (1967);
LeBlanc, supra note 44, at 537.
109. Treece, Trademark Licensing and Vertical Restraints in FranchisingArrangements,
116 U. PA. L. Rv. 435, 438 (1968); Note, Antitrust Problems in Trademark Franchising, 17
STAN. L. REv. 926 (1965).
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ence; 110 allow small producers to compete against larger ones;' and increase
11
customer choice because licensing trademarks stimulates greater production. 2
On the other hand, trademark licensing tends to be anticompetitive because
it discourages innovation by licensee and licensor once the mark has become
established; discourages entry into a product market where a particular mark
is already established; and disrupts local markets when they are invaded by
1 13
an established mark, thereby forcing local producers out of business.
The individual who possesses a mark that he wishes to license is faced
with two basic risks. Under trademark law, a mark owner who allows another
to use his mark without retaining a sufficient amount of control over the
quality of the product in conjunction with which the mark is employed by
the licensee runs the risk of loss of his rights to the mark itself.114 Additionally, the licensor must consider the fact that the licensee is to a large
extent selling the goodwill embodied in the mark. The franchisor thus has
legal and practical business reasons for retaining some degree of control over
the use of the mark.115 The second basic risk that the licensor faces, then, is
the loss of his rights to the mark for an antitrust law violation occasioned by
his attempting to conform to the dictates of trademark law and in so doing
exerting a prohibited degree of control over the mark franchisee.11 6
In the relationship between licensor and licensee, the latter must depend
upon the former for a determination of minimal product or service standards and for a determination of what amounts to a conformance with
those basic standards. Of necessity, the licensee must at least cede to the
licensor the right to inspect his production facilities and finished products
as well as the right to determine the fate of nonconforming products.1

7

It is

in attempting to implement alternatives to on-the-spot inspection of franchisees that the trademark or trade name franchisor begins to encounter the
prohibitions of the antitrust laws.
The use of tying arrangements in connection with a trademark license is
usually traced to the licensor's attempts to insure that the mark will be used
only in conjunction with products or services of a quality commensurate with
that generally associated with the mark. 1 " From a business viewpoint, tying
is necessary when used in connection with a mark where the products sold
110. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Note, supra note 109,
at 926.
111. Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403, 413 (5th Cir. 1962).
112. Note, supra note 109, at 926.
113. Id.; Note, Quality Control and the Antitrust Laws in Trademark Licensing, 72
YALE L.J. 1171, 1190-91 (1963).
114. Dawn Donut Co., Inc. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358 (2d Cir. 1959);
Covey, supra note 97, at 611-12; Treece supra note 109, at 465-67.
115. Covey, supra note 97, at 612.
116. Swizer Bros., Inc. v. Locklin, 297 F.2d 39, 416 (7th Cir. 1961). See Timken Co. v.
United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951); Treece, supra note 109, at 466-67; Note, supra note

109, at 927.
117.
118.
(1965).

Treece, supra note 109, at 465.
Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 050 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

15

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5
1969]

ANTITRUST PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISOR

under the mark are, for example, derived from a secret formula. In such
situations tying is generally permitted."19 Even in cases where the formula for
the product is not secret, the franchisor may attempt to employ tying as an
alternative to on-the-spot inspection of each franchisee's production facilities.
When employed in such a manner and not primarily as a trade restraint, such
arrangements are generally subject to a rule-of-reason standard and are fre20
quently sustained.1
Tying arrangements have been held illegal in situations where the supplying party had sufficient economic power with respect to the tying product
to appreciably restrain free competition in the market for the tied product.' 2'
The question, which then must be considered, is whether a trademark may be
said to be a tying item and if so, whether it can be said to possess the degree
of "power" necessary to find such a use illegal. 22 Brown Shoe, Atlantic Refining, and Texaco 23 seem to indicate that the inquiry should be answered
in the affirmative. However, it should be noted that in those cases the tying
arrangements were not employed in a manner designed to protect the goodwill embodied in the franchised mark.1 24 Additionally, the Brown Shoe case
does not appear to have involved any of those "singular factors which are
so inherent in and distinguish a franchise situation from an ordinary manu125
facturer-retailer relationship."'
The leading case in this area is Susser v. Carvel Corporation.326 There
the court noted that "in compelling circumstances the protection of goodwill,
as embodied for example in a valuable trademark, may justify an otherwise
invalid tying arrangement."' 2 The compelling circumstances permitting the
tying agreement in Carvel included the fact that since the Carvel franchise
was a format franchise, all products sold on the premises would be attributable
to the franchisor. 2 8 Additionally, Carvel's primary product, soft ice cream,
was noted to be one that would not easily lend itself to advance specifications
enabling each franchisee to purchase his own supplies from an independent
29
dealer.

119. Id.; Dole, The Interplay of Trade Symbol Protection and the Antitrust Laws, 13
ANTmusr BULL. 1347, 1356 (1968).
120. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964); Engbrecht v. Dairy Queen Co.,
203 F. Supp. 714 (D. Kan. 1962).
121. Note, supra note 109, at 929; see discussion note 80 et seq. supra.
122. Dillon, supra note 99, at 151; Note, supra note 109, at 929.
123. See discussion note 85 et seq. supra.
124. Ward, Antitrust Aspects of Restrictions To Protect the Integrity of a Trademark
and Preserve Goodwill, 36 ABA ANTrrrusr LAw J. 52, 59 (1967).
125. Zeidman, supra note 88, at 1204.
126. 332 F.2d 505 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 381 U.S. 125 (1965); Comment, Tying
Arrangement With Trademark as the Tying Item Is Not a Per Se Violation of the Antitrust
Laws, 63 MicH. L. REV. 550 (1965).
127. Id. at 512.
128. Id. at 518-21. See Dole, supra note 119, at 1354; Zeidman, supra note 88, at 1204.
129. 332 F.2d at 520. Cf. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United States,
337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). Dole, supra note 119, at 1354, suggests that if advance standards
had been feasible, the tying arrangement would have been unnecessary.
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In Carvel, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the contention
that for antitrust purposes a trademark should be accorded the same treatment as a patent. 130 However, the court did not reject the contention that a
trademark could, in and of itself, constitute a tying item. In a later Federal
Trade Commission action, 131 arising from the same facts as Susser v. Carvel
Corporation, the Commission held a trademark could not be a tying item
since it cannot be conceptualized as separate and apart from the product
that it identifies. 132 Nonetheless, it should be noted that Carvel had numerous
competitors and that entry into the soft ice cream market was relatively easy.
Both Carvel decisions contain clear warnings to franchisors with significant
market power and who operate in markets where there are substantial barriers to entry. Such licensors must have "sound business reasons for tying the
1 33
purchase of goods or services to the license of their trade symbols."
The cornerstone of a successful franchise is a licensed trade name or trade
symbol. 3 While it is clear that trademark license agreements do not constitute carte blanch6 exceptions to the antitrust laws,13 5 it is equally clear that
antitrust policy does not demand a blanket prohibition of those restrictions
necessary for the reasonable operation of a trademark franchising system.' 36
TERRITORIAL RESTRAINTS

Territorial restraints include such devices as exclusive dealerships, dealer
location clauses, and area of primary responsibility clauses.' 37 Exclusive
dealerships, which are the most frequently encountered type of territorial
restraints,38 manifest themselves in one of two basic formats-purely territorial restraints or customer restraints that ultimately have a territorial impact.

39

In the former the dealer is given an area in which he may sell to

anyone who is in that area regardless of the buyer's primary business location.140 In the latter, the dealer is also assigned a territory within which he
130. The existence of a patent is prima facie evidence of the power necessary to taint
a tying arrangement with illegality, Standard Oil Co. of Cal. & Standard Stations v. United
States, 337 U.S. 293, 306 (1949). See also Rudnick, The Franchisor's Dilemma: Can He
Satisfy the Legal and Commercial Requirements of a Trademark Licensing System Without
Exposing Himself to Other Legal Risks, 56 TRADE.IARK REP. 621, 629 n.l3 (1966).

131. Carvel Corp. [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 17,298 (F.T.C. Dkt.
8574).
132. Id. 22,429. Contra, Anchor Serum Co. v. FTC, 217 F.2d 867 (7th Cir. 1954).
133. Dole, supra note 119, at 1356.
134. Susser v. Carvel Corp., 206 F. Supp. 636, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
135. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951), indicated
that "[a] trademark cannot be legally used as a device for Sherman Act violations."
136. LeBlanc,

Antitrust Ramifications of

Trademark Licensing and Franchising, 53

519, 544 (1963).
137. Pollock, Alternative DistributionMethods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 595, 602
(1968). Exclusive dealerships with their territorial impact are to be distinguished from
requirements contracts' impact of exclusive dealing.
138. Zeidman, supra note 88, at 1197.
139. Covey, supra note 97, at 610.
140. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 830-32 (7th Cir. 1963). See the discussion note 230 et seq. infra.
TRADEMARK REP.
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is to operate but is additionally limited to selling to those customers who
141
reside or have a business operation within his designated territory.
Until fairly recently, vertically imposed territorial restraints were attacked
under the antitrust laws as being per se illegal only when they occurred in
conjunction with some other restrictive practice such as price fixing. 142 They
were viewed in light of traditional legal concepts; that is, as ancillary restraints
occasioned by a contractual relationship between buyer and seller or consignor and consignee. But, relying on dictum in a 1944 case, United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,243 the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice initiated a vigorous and successful campaign against
vertically imposed customer and territorial restraints. 44 The basic premise
of the campaign was that such restraints were illegal per se and could not be
justified through a rule of reason inquiry. 45
White Motor Co. v. United States' 46 seemed to be the case that would diminish, if not completely curtail, the Government's per se condemnation of
vertically imposed customer and territorial restraints. Justice Douglas, in the
majority opinion of White Motor, acknowledged that while the restraints
in question could very well have an injurious impact upon competition and
thereby subject the restraints to the sanctions of the antitrust laws, there was
in 1963 insufficient understanding of the economic impact of such restraints to
justify the application of a per se rule in light of its inherent harshness. 147
Indeed, he noted that such restraints "may be... the only practicable means
a small company has for breaking into or staying in business .... ,148
While the antitrust bar apparently took White Motor to indicate that
absent any overtones of a horizontal agreement, a vertically imposed exclusive
dealership arrangement would be judged under the rule of reason, 4. 9 the
Government evidentially felt otherwise.5 0 Nonetheless, two subsequent cases,
141. United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); Covey, supra note 97,
at 610; Day, Exclusive TerritorialArrangements Under the Antitrust Laws-A Reappraisal,

40 N.C.L. Rav. 223, 227 (1962).
142. E.g., White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1964); Dr. Miles Medical
Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, 220 U.S. 373 (1911); General Cigar Co., 16 FTC 537 (1932).
143. 321 U.S. 707, 721 (1944): "A distributor of a trade-marked article may not lawfully
limit by agreement, express or implied, the price at which or the persons to whom its purchasers may resell .... The same thing is true as to restrictions of customers."
144. Note, Validity of Vertical Restraints, 51 MARQ. L. Rv. 395, 397-98 (1967).
145. E.g., United States v. Lone Star Cadillac, 1963 TRADE GAs. ff70,739 (N.D. Tex. 1963);
United States v. Sperry Rand Corp., 1962 TRADE CAs. ff70,495 (W.D.N.Y. 1962); Travers &
Wright, Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 Hiav. L. Rav. 795,
796-97

(1962). See Stone, Closed Territorial Distribution: An Opening Question in the

Sherman Act, 30 U. Cm. L. Rav. 286, 288 (1963).
146. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
147. Justice Douglas speaking of the effect on competition reasoned: "We do not
know enough of the economic and business stuff out of which these arrangements emerge
to be certain." Id. at 263.
148. Id.
149. McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Distributors and Dealers-Prices,
Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive Products, 13 ANTrrausr BULL. 161,

166 (1968).
150. The Government ultimately prevailed by obtaining a consent decree, United States
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Sandura Co. v. Federal Trade Commission-11 and Snap-On Tool Corp. v.
Federal Trade Commission,152 which embraced the White Motor rationale,
served to bolster the confidence of those who relied upon vertically imposed
restraints to achieve certain business goals. In some instances, courts granted
lost profits to distributors whose exclusive territories had been infringed by
15 3
another distributor.
White Motor, Sandura, and Snap-On were manifestations of a reluctance
on the part of the courts to apply a per se rule to vertically imposed customer
and territorial restraints. By 1967, this trend had become so firmly established
that the Government did not seek an application of the per se rule in the
case in which its applicability was finally announced. During the oral argument of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &cCo.,15 4 Justice Black interrupted
government counsel and inquired: "Am I to understand from your argument
that the Government does not want to win this case on a per se argument?"
Unequivocally, government counsel replied: "That's correct." 155
Schwinn sold its bicycles primarily to or through twenty-two wholesale
distributors, from whom numerous retailers purchased and resold to the
public. Schwinn assigned specific territories to each distributor who was then
required to sell only to franchised Schwinn retailers and only in territories
that had been specifically assigned.156 Schwinn franchised approved retail outlets, and although the franchise did not prevent the handling of other brands,
it required that the retailer promote Schwinn products.
The Supreme Court found illegal per se those restraints imposed upon the
bicycles that had been sold to the distributors. However, the Court ruled
v. White Motor Co., 1964 TRADE GAS.

71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Even though the restraints

were never proved to be unreasonable, the White Motor Company agreed to discontinue
its franchising practices completely. Id. One commentator indicated that White's agreeing
to a consent decree reflects the relative unimportance of territorial and customer restrictions. Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Sealy and Schwinn, 12 AN-u-rasT

BULL. 1181, 1187 n.8 (1967) (Mr. Zimmerman was the First Ass't, Antitrust Division, Dep't
of Justice). It seems equally if not more likely that the consent decree reflects the high
cost of antitrust litigation. Schwinn's expenditures amounted to $500,000 from the time

the complaint was filed until the final judgment was entered by the trial court on remand
from the Supreme Court. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 567, 568
(N.D. Ill. 1968). White's expenses were probably also substantial.
151. 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964). The court of appeals reversed the FTC's ruling and
refused to find Sandura's arrangement illegal without "examining [its] effect upon competition and the facts offered to justify the resulting restraint." Id. at 850. Basically, Sandura
had imposed the restraint because it had come upon hard times and needed to obtain maximum market coverage for an unmarketable product.
152. 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963). "[T]here are certain advantages to a manufacturer ...
in requiring an exclusive territorial arrangement with its dealers which promotes (rather

than suppresses) in a broad, meaningful way, competition between it and other manufacturers of similar products, and which therefore justify a minimal curtailment of intrabrand
competition among its dealers." Id. at 831-32.

153.
154.
155.
156.
dicates

E.g., Exercycle of Michigan, Inc. v. Wayson, 341 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1965).
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
35 U.S.L.W. 3369, 3373 (April 25, 1967) (summary of oral arguments in Schwinn).
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 341 (N.D. 11. 1965) inthat the company distributed maps assigning specific territories.
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that those restraints applicable to the bicycles that had not been sold to the
distributors, but consigned to them, were not subject to the same per se
condemnation. In determining that they were not illegal, the Court applied
the rule of reason to these restraints.
In reaching this result the Court implicitly rejected a number of justifications put forth in favor of territorial restrictions. These arguments, which
favor the use of such restraints and which are equally applicable to customer
restraints, are myriad: territorial restraints benefit the manufacturer by insuring him that his product will be marketed in an orderly fashion; 157 their
use facilitates his entry into new geographic markets;1 58 they serve as a deterrent to vertical integration and horizontal mergers among competitors; 59
such restraints stimulate dealer participation, since dealers soon realize that
they are protected from ruinous intrabrandcompetition; 60 they allow a manufacturer to exclude unskilled distributors and retailers in order to avoid tort
liability and maintain the reputation of his product; 161 they generally increase efficiency in distribution while insuring maximum market coverage; 1 21
they enhance servicing where special facilities or knowledge or both are required;16 and they generally enhance interbrand competition.64
The commentators and courts are equally prolific in discovering virtues
of territorial restraints when viewed from the position of the franchisee.1 5
Generally, their praise is focused upon the fact that such restraints enable
the little man to get a slice of the capitalistic pie without really putting himself in economic jeopardy. He is given exclusive rights to market a product
within a given area and knows that he alone (as opposed to other distributors) will reap the benefits from all the time and capital he devotes to cultivating his protected market.
The per se rule promulgated in Schwinn has been diluted somewhat by
later decisions. In Albrecht v. Herald Co.,168 Justice Douglas indicated in his
concurring opinion that in Schwinn the Court "noted that evidence of record
'elaborately sets forth information as to the total market interaction and intrabrand competition, as well as the distribution practices and plans.' "167
The case seems to indicate that the Court presently will not apply the
157.
158.

Zeidman, Antitrust Aspects of Franchising, MxCn. ST. B.J., May 1966, at 31.
Shuman, The Future of Franchisingand Trade Regulation, 14 How. L. J. 60, 73

(1968).
159. Id. at 63.
160. Note, supra note 109, at 939. Contra, Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1186.
161. Comment, Restricted Distribution After Schwinn, 9 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 1032,

1043 (1968).
162.

Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price-Fixing and Market

Division, 75 YALE L.J. 373, 375 (1966); Travers & Wright, supra note 145, at 813.
163.

Kittelle, Territorial and Customer Restrictions Through Consignment or Agency

- Schwinn or Sin?, 12 Ax-rrrusr BuLT.
164.
LAW.

1007, 1031 (1967).

Covey, Franchisingand the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 Noa

DAME

605, 613 (1967); Stone, supra note 145, at 311; Travers 8&Wright, supra note 145,

at 800.
165. See authorities cited notes 155-162 supra.

166. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
167.

Id. at 155.
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Schwinn per se rule with all of its potential. This possibility has been enhanced by the appointment of Chief Justice Burger and the retirement of
Justice Fortas.6 8
In Mississippi Valley Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission,169 a contractual clause providing that the "[b]uyer shall not sell gas . . . to any one
industrial customer in excess of 100,000 cubic feet . .. per month except by

express written consent of the seller" was alleged to be in violation of the
Schwinn per se rule.170 The court acknowledged the existence of the rule, but
indicated that it was inapplicable to the subject matter of the case. The restraint in the contract was reasonable in light of the unique nature of public
utilities and the apparent purpose of the clause to insure the seller that it
would not be subject to a demand that would so drain its resources as to
render it unable to supply other customers. Although this factor can be said
to distinguish the case from Schwinn, the decision nonetheless ignores the
spirit if not the language of Schwinn.
Another significant case interpreting the Schwinn rule is Janel Sales Corp.
v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc.1 '1 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated in
172
Janel:
[T]he existence of such a contractual clause does not necessarily imply
a per se violation. In [Schwinn], the Supreme Court premised its
finding of a per se violation on the fact that Schwinn had been "firm
and resolute" in insisting on compliance.
The disputed clause in Janel provided that the "'[r]etailer' will not sell any
'l7
of the '[c]ommodities' except to customers for use."'
Albrecht, Mississippi Valley Gas, and Janel seem to indicate a reluctance
on the part of the courts to embrace the per se rule of Schwinn in situations
that differ even slightly from that of Schwinn. Perhaps the rule will become
so riddled with exceptions that for all practical purposes it will cease to exist.
Nonetheless, the Schwinn per se rule represents the law as it now stands, and
one must frame his actions with that rule in mind.
The position reflected by the lower federal courts in Janel and Mississippi
Valley Gas and the position of Justice Douglas in Albrecht may in some part
be attributable to criticism of Schwinn's per se rule. Such criticism has
centered primarily upon two areas: anticipated vertical integration as a result
of the adoption of the rule17 and the adoption of the rule absent conclusive
evidence that the types of restraints employed by Schwinn were so completely
without redeeming value as to merit a per se condemnation."

The anticipated

168.
169.
170.

Wall Street Journal, May 16, 1969, at 1, cols. 7-8.
398 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 396 n.5.

171.

396 F.2d 398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 89 St. Ct. 303 (1968).

172.

396 F.2d at 406.

173.

Id. at 400.

174.

Keck, Alternative Distribution Techniques-Franchising, Consignment, Agency and

Licensing, 13 ANTIRrusr BULL. 177, 178 (1968).
175. See Note, supra note 144, at 399; Comment, supra note 161, at 1042.
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vertical integration becomes particularly undesirable when it becomes apparent that it will occur primarily at the expense of the smaller businessman."76 To some extent this prediction has been borne out, 77 but whether
this is representative of a trend is unclear. Similar prognostications made
after the Standard Stations decision have failed to materialize.' 78 At least one
commentator has questioned whether there is enough distinction between the
actual operation of a franchised and a unitary system to make the anticipated
79
integration of any moment.
This criticism of the per se rule revolves largely around the Court's unarticulated analysis of the inter- and intra-brand spheres of competition.'8 0
The Schwinn decision represents a judicial value judgment as to the relative
merits of interbrand and intrabrand competition. Upon the suggestion of
the Government, the Court considered the relationship of these two types of
competition, but referred to the matter only in a cryptic remark after approving the consignment exception: "Application of the rule of reason cannot be
confined to intrabrand competition."''
Justice Brennan, concurring in the White Motor decision, noted that territorial restraints may have an anticompetitive impact on intrabrand competition and then further noted that their impact upon competition was probably far less significant than that of resale price maintenance.182 He was
therefore unable to condemn them at the time. Such reservations in condemning restraints that affect only intrabrand competition are not without
merit. Through protecting vast marketing systems from intrabrand competition
one may stimulate the rise of stronger manufacturers who would increase the
intensity of interbrand competition and perhaps bring about an over-all
increase in competition.' 83 Accordingly, the removal of intrabrand competition from the scrutiny of the antitrust laws has strong advocates who, because
of the interrelationship between intrabrand competition and territorial restraints, offer justifications similar to those discussed above.18 4 Obviously, such
justifications are irrelevant if the product sold by the franchisee is unique. In
such a situation, there can be no interbrand competition and no overriding
need to sacrifice intrabrand competition to preserve interbrand competition
176. Keck, supra note 174, at 178. See also Simon, Dual Distribution, 37 ABA ANTrrrusr

L.J. 168, 170 (1968).
177. Of the twenty-two original Schwinn distributors, nineteen have been absorbed into
the company and the other three, which are presently on consignment arrangements, have
been notified of the impending termination of their contracts. United States v. Arnold,
1968) (mem. accompanying final judgment).
Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 567, 568 (N.D. Ill.
178. Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1186.
179. Shuman, supra note 158, at 63.
180. As with a number of the Court's decisions and as predicted, Zeidman, The
Growth and Importance of Franchising- Its Impact on Small Business, 12 ANTITRUST BULL.

1191, 1207 (1967), criticism has led to legislative proposals to except territorial restraints
from the antitrust laws in some situations. See H.R. 3645, 7056, 8866, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969).

181.
182.
183.
184.

388 U.S. at 382.
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 268 (1963).
Covey, supra note 164, at 620.
Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1182. See note 157 et seq. supra.
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can be shown. s5 However, in Schwinn the Court was faced with a situation
that was not as clearly defined as in the above examples. In electing between
a per se rule and a rule of reason the Court was actually making a choice
between interbrand and intrabrand competition. Had the Court held all the
restraints illegal per se, intrabrand competition would have been stimulated
by allowing previously restricted dealers to invade lucrative markets that had
previously been protected under the challenged restraints. On the other hand
to have refused to apply a per se rule would have probably permitted Schwinn
ultimately to retain the restraints, after a trial on the merits.'1s This would
have been detrimental to intrabrand competition, while still allowing Schwinn
to compete more effectively against the large unitary systems that were the
critical competitive factors in Schwinn's originally adopting the restraints.
It would be an understatement to say that the choice has been hotly debated,
but one commentator has suggested a cogent reason for refusing to protect
intrabrand competition in all but the new and failing company situations
allowed by Schwinn. He noted that particularly in concentrated industries
"the further product differentiation [interbrand competition] which may
be encouraged by the restrictions - the alleged benefit - serves largely to help
transfer oligopolistic behavior to the distribution level and to encourage intrabrand 'product'

competition at

the expense

1
of price competition." s7

One of the most persuasive suggestions concerning the underlying reasons for
the adoption of the per se rule in Schwinn concerns the heavy workload
of the federal courts coupled with the inability of the federal judiciary to
cope with the complex economic problems presented by most antitrust litigation.188

185. Jordan, Exclusive and Restrictive Sales Under the Antitrust Laws, 9 U.C.L.A.L.
REv. 111, 115 (1961). Schwinn argued in the district court that its bicycles were actually a
unique product, 237 F. Supp. 326 (1965), but this aspect of the case was not mentioned
in the Supreme Court's decision.
186. But see Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and
Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw 9C CONTFA.P. PROB. 506 (1966).
187. Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1185.
188. Adoption of a per se rule would reduce considerably the quantum of evidence
that would have to be introduced to establish that a challenged restraint was illegal, because there would be no allowance for a showing of any offsetting justifications for the use
of the restraint. McLaren, supra note 149, at 168. The record filed with the Court in Schwinn
consisted of twenty-three volumes, which were submitted only sixty days before oral
arguments were heard and 113 days before the decision was handed down. Id. The Justices
themselves have frequently noted the burden imposed upon the Court by complex antitrust
litigation, United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 175 n.1 (1963); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963); United States v. Trenton Potteries, 273
U.S. 392 (1927). Congressional response to the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§28-29 (1964),
which allows antitrust litigations to be appealed directly to the Supreme Court and thus
a crucial factor in increasing the Court's burden, has been equivocal. See S. 2721, 2806,
90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). See also Hearings on Expediting Act Amendments Before the
Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1968). The Nixon administration has urged amendment of the Expediting Act as
a partial solution to the problems encountered by the Court in antitrust litigation. 115
CONG. Rac. H5899 (daily ed. July 14, 1969); Wall Street Journal, July 15, 1969, at 4, col. 3.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1969

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [1969], Art. 5

1969]

ANTITRUST PROBLEMS OF THE FRANCHISOR

The correctness of these interpretations is not as significant as their uncertainty. Although the Court noted in White Motor that in 1963 there was
insufficient knowledge of the economic impact of vertically imposed territorial
and customer restraints to justify an application of a per se rule,18 9 it failed
to indicate that any such information had become available in applying a per
se rule to almost identical restraints in Schwinn. Indeed, one thorough study
of such restraints indicates that their competitive impact varies considerably
and is primarily dependent upon the ends sought to be accomplished through
their use.19 0
The agency or consignment exception' 91 seems to afford considerable leeway to those who would be affected by the Schwinn per se rule. However,
ranking counsel of the Federal Trade Commission have warned that it is
not an open invitation to circumvent the spirit of the per se prohibition
against restraints upon products that have been sold to the franchisee. If
accomplished solely to take advantage of the consignment exception, any
sudden alteration in the structure of a distribution system will be viewed with
suspicion.192 Others have similarly warned that mere form will not insulate a
consignment type system from attack. 0 3 Indeed, the Court seems to indicate
that in order to fall under the consignment exception, the consignee must be
something very close to a "mere salesman."' 194 Furthermore, at least one Federal Trade Commission attorney has indicated that those consignment arrangements that seemingly fall under the Schwinn rule may nonetheless be found
to violate section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act: "Indeed, section 5
was designed to cope with cases like this."' 95 This position is supported by
a statement of a former Small Business Administration chief counsel, who
questioned whether the consignment-sale distinction was a sufficient basis
for a significant exception to a per se rule.19 6 Finally, there is some concern
as to whether the consignment exception is really of any benefit to the small
businessman who wants to set up a distribution system, yet who does not have
the capital necessary to finance a large inventory.197
189. 372 U.S. 253, 263-64 (1963).
190. Preston, note 186 supra.
191. There are other justifications which were alluded to in Schwinn and which are
solidly entrenched in decisional precedent, dealing with infant industries and failing companies. 388 U.S. at 374. See Orrick, Marketing Restrictions Imposed To Protect the Integrity
of "Franchise" Distribution Systems, 36 ABA ANTrrRusr L.J. 63, 69-70 (1967). The impact
of these justifications has been observed in the discussion of Jerrold Electronics (infant
industry) at note 70 et seq. supra and in Snap-On Tools (failing company) at note 152
supra.

192.

BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE RIE. REP., Feb. 18, 1969, at A-6, A-7.
See Zeidman, Small Business Concerns-Franchising and Its Antitrust Problems,
29 ALA. LAw. 460, 469 (1968), commenting on the prerequisites enumerated in Schwinn,
193.

388 U.S. at 381-82.
194. 388 U.S. at 381. See Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1189.
195. Wilson, Exclusionary Restraints and Franchise Distribution, 12
1169, 1176 (1967).
196. Zeidman, supranote 193, at 471-72.
197.

ANTrRUST BULL.

Jones, The Growth and Importance of Franchisingand the Role of Law, 12 ANT-

TRUST BuLL. 717, 738-39 (1967).
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For franchisees, consignment involves a further question. Although in
1966 the SBA amended its regulations to allow franchisees to qualify for SBA
financial assistance, the requirements now indicate that a small businessman
(franchisee-consignee) must retain the "risk of loss" in order to qualify for
the assistance.198 This would seem to conflict with the express requirement of
Schwinn that the risk of loss remain with the franchisor (manufacturer) in
order for the distribution system to qualify for the consignment exception.
The uncertainty arises from whether the term "risk of loss" means the same
thing to the SBA as to the Court in Schwinn.
Other commentators have not stopped to question the validity of the
consignment exception, but have further questioned the viability of the entire
decision. 199 This criticism is based upon the premise that a traditionally per
se illegal price-fixing conspiracy can be established from the facts presented
in the Schwinn decision. Although the Government did not appeal the district court's rejection of its allegation of price-fixing, government counsel
attempted to raise a price-fixing contention based on the fact that the territorial and customer restraints had been employed to ameliorate price competition by keeping Schwinn's products out of discount houses and other
volume dealers' inventories.200 The Court's refusal to hear the argument on
procedural grounds does not, however, weaken the argument that the activity
falls within the standards of United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc.20 1
In Socony the Court indicated that "[a]ny combination which tampers with
price structure is engaged in an unlawful activity."20- To equate the "amelioration" involved in Schwinn with tampering does not seem unreasonable, at
least in the eyes of the Department of Justice 0 3 But in order to establish the
requisite price-fixing conspiracy, one must turn to United States v. Parke, Davis

8 Co.20 4 and related cases. These cases interpret certain reporting and policing
activities resulting in refusals to deal between manufacturers and independent
wholesalers as conspiratorial. An apt analogy can be made here between the
wholesalers and manufacturers and franchisees and franchisors and between
refusals to deal and cancellation of a franchise for failure to abide by a
territorial restriction.205 Combining the Parke, Davis and Socony concepts,
it is conceivable that a "potpourri theory . .. might require Schwinn to be

198. See discussion note 5 supra.
199. Kittelle, supra note 163, at 1025-29.
200. Id. at 1021.
201.

310 U.S. 150 (1940).

202. Id. at 222 (emphasis added).
203. See, e.g., United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, Inc., 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir.
1961); Plymouth Dealers' Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 279 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1960).
204.

362 U.S. 29 (1960).

205. This impact was summarized in United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127,
144-45 (1966), where the conspiracy finding was based upon a Parke-Davis rationale: "What
resulted was a fabric interwoven by many strands of joint action to eliminate the discounters from participation in the market, to inhibit the free choice of franchise dealers to
select their own method of trade and to provide multilateral surveillance and enforcement.
This process can by no stretch of the imagination be described as 'unilateral' or merely
.parallel.'"
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confined to situations where there is not only no price fixing in the sense of
stipulated prices, but no amelioration of price competition through a syste20 6
matic denial of merchandise to discount houses and other price cutters." 1
This position finds further support in the analysis of one commentator who
feels that the language in Schwinn as to the creation and perpetuation of the
territorial restrictions - "[w]hether by explicit agreement or by silent combination or understanding" 20 7 -has by use of the word "silent" actually extended the rule of Parke, Davis.20 This position, if accepted, would relegate
Schwinn to an emasculated position similar to that of United States v. Colgate
& Co.209

Trademarks and TeritorialRestrictions
The impact of a trademark licensing agreement on vertically imposed territorial and customer restraints is somewhat unclear. Although the Supreme
Court has indicated that one may not employ a trademark to legitimize activity that would otherwise be illegal under the antitrust laws, 210 it failed to
face squarely this issue in its most recent decision involving all of these
factors, United States v. Sealy, Inc.,2 1 1 decided on the same day as Schwinn.

Sealy was an "umbrella corporation" that had been formed by a group of
mattress manufacturers.2 12 Sealy held the rights to the Sealy trademark and
licensed it to each of its founder-stockholders on a territorial basis. The Court
disregarded the Government's contention that the territorial agreements were
to be condemned as per se illegal, revived the retail price-fixing aspects, which
had not been relied upon by the Government on appeal, and held that the
2 13
territorial arrangements coupled with price fixing were illegal

206. Kittelle, supra note 163, at 1025-29.
207. 388 U.S. at 382.
208. Kittelle, supra note 163, at 1022.
209. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). Compare Colgate, with United States v. Parke, Davis & Co.,
362 U.S. 29 (1960).
210. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 599 (1951); Dole, The
Interplay of Trade Symbol Protection and the Antitrust Laws, 14 ANrrusr BULL. 1347,
1352 (1968).
211. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
212. Kintner, Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements-As Viewed By a
Member of the Private Bar, 12 ANTrmusr BULL. 1211, 1213 (1967), describes these umbrella
corporations.
213. 388 U.S. at 354-57. See McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals To Deal, 37 ABA AirrrRusr L.J. 137, 141
(1968); Zeidman, supra note 193, at 468. Rudnick, The Sealy Case, 57 TRADmARK REP. 459,
466 (1967) indicates that: "Both the territorial restrictions and the price-fixing practices,
as well as other restraints, could be lawfully reinstated if all or a substantial number of
Sealy's shareholder-licensees merged into a single company. Even under the greatly expanded
antimerger doctrines currently applicable under the Sherman and Clayton Acts, it is
doubtful whether even a merger of all Sealy licensees into a single company would be
illegal. . . . [1]t remains an anomaly that partial restraints are condemned per se whereas
the total restraints that would follow from a merger would in the very least be appraised
in terms of their market impact."
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The Court's failure to condemn the territorial allocation of Scaly has been
taken to indicate that the presence of limited territorial trade symbol licenses was a distinguishing factor between the application of a per se rule in
Schwinn and the Court's reliance upon a finding of illegal price fixing in
Sealy. 2 14 However, it appears that the Court has expressly reserved decision
on the effect of territorial allocation among small concerns as incident to a
joint common name and common advertising plan absent unlawful price
fixing.215 The Court might have an opportunity to rule on the legality of
such an arrangement in the near future. United States v. Topco Associates,
Inc.,216 filed in the Northern District of Illinois in January 1968, challenges
the validity of limited territorial trade symbol licenses to twenty-five grocers
by an umbrella corporation that they control. Apparently, there has been no
allegation of illegal price fixing in the case.217
Because the Court did not decide Scaly on the basis of the territorial
restraints imposed upon the licensees of the mark, it should not be concluded
that the law respecting trademark licensing in a franchise context has been
altered.2 1 s Accordingly, where such arrangements represent bona fide attempts
to protect valuable rights associated with the mark, where the division
of territories is not the central purpose of the arrangement, and where no
21
unreasonable restraint of trade results, such arrangements are legal. 9
Less Restrictive TerritorialRestraints

Noting that the restraints employed in Schwinn were designed to overcome
bona fide business problems, one commentator has indicated that the restrictions were still unnecessarily stringent: "The cure [was] too drastic for
the illness. Less restrictive alternatives exist. ' ' 22 0 The purpose of this subsection
is to examine those alternatives and the possibilities they hold for the franchisor. Consideration will be given to exclusive selling, areas of plimary
responsibility, and dealer location clauses - methods of restraint involved in
neither Schwinn nor Sealy.221
214.

BNA

ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP.

Jan. 16, 1968, at A-14. But see Dole, supra

note 210, at 1351-54; Zimmerman, supra note 150, at 1187.
215. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967): "It is argued, for example, that
a number of small grocers might allocate territory among themselves on an exclusive basis
as incident to the use of a common name and common advertisements, and that this sort
of venture should be welcomed in the interests of competition, and should not be condemned as per se unlawful. But condemnation [of Sealy's] territorial arrangements certainly
Id. at
does not require us to go so far as to condemn that quite different situation .

357.
216. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., Civ. No. 68 C 76, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
E45,068 (N.D. Ill., filed Jan. 15, 1968).
217. BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE. REG. REP., Jan. 16, 1968, at A-14. Dole, supra note
210, at 1352.
218. Jones, supra note 197, at 741-42.
219. LeBlanc, Antitrust Ramifications of Trademark Licensing and Franchising, 53
TRADEMARK REP. 519, 537-38 (1963).
220. Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After Scaly and Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL.
1181, 1184 (1967).
221. Pollock, Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 595, 602
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Exclusive Selling. These restraints are agreements that prevent the franchisor's selling the franchised product to anyone other than the franchisee
within a specified territory. 222 Many justifications, not surprisingly very similar to those offered in favor of the more strict restraints, are offered for
exclusive selling. 223 For the present at least, these justifications are still relevant and properly arguable before a court since no per se rule has been applied in this area.
The only significant cases that directly address the problem, Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Co.224 and Schwing Motor Co. v. Hudson
Sales Corp., 25 involve unique situations: both dealt with automobile companies with declining financial fortunes. Some commentators have seized upon
this factor, articulated it to indicate a lack of market dominance, and thus
questioned the relevance of Schwing and Webster to cases not involving finan22
cially doomed companies. 6
This concern is particularly apropos in view of the possibility of the courts'
viewing the existence of a franchise agreement as indicative of the power
necessary to render a tying arrangement illegal. 227 Excepting the unique circumstances of Schwing and Webster, will the franchisor be presumed to have
the market dominance in the manner of Texaco? The answer at this point
is uncertain, but some arguments for not applying a per se rule have been advanced. One of these focuses upon the economic waste that arises in situations
where a weak competitor is unable to reduce the selling costs that it encounters by the elimination of superfluous dealers. 228 However, the better
argument points out that refusing to examine the business necessities of such
companies would only favor their larger counterparts because only the
smaller operations really need the restraints. 229 Clearly, a per se rule in such
circumstances would be opposed to the enhancement of small business sought
by the antitrust laws. Nonetheless, the attorney dealing with exclusive selling
should proceed with caution and employ the restraint only where it is
absolutely necessary.
Areas of Primary Responsibility. Although the Supreme Court did not
allude to the matter in the Schwinn decision, the decision of the district
court in the same case carefully distinguishes between exclusive territorial
restraints and "prime areas of responsibility."30 The district court found

(1968). See also Recent Decision, 60 MIcH. L. Rav. 1006 (1962).

222. Covey, supra note 164, at 609. See discussion at notes 137-141 supra.
223. See discussion at note 157 et seq. supra.
224. 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
225. 239 F.2d 176 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 823 (1957).
226. Covey, supra note 164, at 619 nn. 70-71; see Columbus Coated Fabrics Corp., 55
FTC 1500, 1521 (1959). But see E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v. Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293

(E.D. I1. 1968).
227.
228.
229.
230.

See discussion at note 82 et seq. supra.
Jordan, supra note 185, at 139.
Id. at 155.
237 F. Supp. 323, 340 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
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that Schwinn had the right to assign specific areas as dealers' primary responsibilities,231 and in the final decree on remand from the Supreme Court,
Schwinn was expressly authorized to employ this kind of restraint.232 In so
doing, the trial court adhered to the suggestion in Justice Brennan's con3
curring opinion in White Motor:
[I]t may appear at the trial that whatever legitimate business needs
White advances for territorial limitations could be adequately served,
with less damage to competition, through other devices - for example
an assignment of areas of primary responsibility to each distributor
The only opinion directly approaching approval of the validity of the use of
areas of primary responsibility is Snap-On Tools.2

3

4

While prohibiting certain

restraints employed by the Snap-On Tool Company, the Federal Trade Commission indicated that it would be permissible for the defendant to employ
areas of primary responsibility as an alternate. 235 However, whatever apparent
approval might have been intended was ultimately lost because the decision
turned on the "reasonable business expectations" of the industry, and the
area of primary responsibility concept was relegated to dictum.

236

Nonetheless,

the use of this arrangement in the Schwinn final judgment, and fact that the
Government has consistently urged this form of restraint as a permissible alternative to more strict restraints237 suggests that they can be employed with
relative safety.238
The use of areas of primary responsibility presents real possibilities of
abuse.239 One commentator has suggested that this form of restraint, as well
as others analogous to it, will suffer the fate of the seemingly more restrictive
practices that were the subject of Schwinn if the practical result of the restraints is very much like that of Schwinn.2 40 The impact of these restraints
will be similar to that in Schwinn only in those areas where customers do
not shop around among dealers or where there are few dealers for each
brand, as in the heavy equipment field. With the Parke, Davis threshold
perhaps lowered by Schwinn, 24:1 any attempt to enforce the restraints strictly
by reporting and policing activities, even if of a mild variety, might provoke
government action. However, anticipation of future government action in
231. Id. at 342.

232. 291 F. Supp. 564, 565 (N.D. Ill. 1968); (final judgment); see Pollock, supra note
137 at 604.
233. White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 271 (1963).
234. Snap-On Tools Corp., v. FTC, [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REI'. 115,
546 (FTC Dkt. 7116), rev'd on other grounds, 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963).
235. Snap-On Tools Corp. v. FTC, 321 F.2d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 1963).
236. Id. at 833.
237. Brief for Appellant at 20-21, United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365
(1967).
238. McLaren, supra note 213, at 142.
239. Pollock, supra note 221, at 602.
240. Zimmerman, supra note 220, at 1187-88.
241. See discussion notes 204-205 supra; Dillon, Exclusive Dealing. Requirements Contracts, Tying Arrangements, and Full-line Forcing, 37 ABA ANTITRUST L.J. 146, 153-54 (1968).
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the area only obscures the distinction between the territorial restrictions employed in Schwinn and the area of primary responsibility concept - a distinction that must be kept clear in order to protect activities under the area of
primary responsibility label. It should be emphasized that the latter type
of restraint encourages the franchisee to give proper attention to his assigned area, and less emphasis should be placed upon the territorial impact
of the restraints. Then if the franchisee does not give adequate attention to
his primary area, action, including a refusal to deal (termination), may be
taken by the franchisor 242 in the absence of any anticompetitive motive. In
situations where the refusal to deal is not motivated by a desire to maintain strict territorial divisions among franchisees, but is for a valid business
reason, such as failure adequately to serve an assigned business territory, the
problem is not one of antitrust but is a question of contractual interpretation
2 43
between franchisee and franchisor.
Dealer Location Clauses. This form of restraint is very similar to areas of
primary responsibility, and its slightly different terminology - "zones of influence" - seems hardly distinguishable from areas of primary responsibility.
As with areas of primary responsibility, there is little applicable case law.
Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp.2 44 appears to have upheld such
clauses in franchise contracts. However, the decision turned largely upon the
5
lack of any showing that General Motors had been unfair to the plaintiff,24
and its reasoning is currently subject to some question. The court noted that
the defendant:246
[H]ad the right under its contract to discontinue dealings with the
plaintiff on 30 days' notice. Under such circumstances, we can see
no reason why it should not be allowed to fix location for the sale of
used cars at a place that did not unduly affect other dealers.
Such a result is contrary to the Supreme Court's Texaco decision that the
power of the franchisor to terminate is sufficient to implement a per se rule
in the tying area. 24 7 However, an argument that the arrangements in Boro
Hall amounted to a tying agreement seems inapposite. Tying arrangements
do not generally involve territorial restrictions; rather, another body of law
has evolved to deal with them. Furthermore, one might be able to defeat a
charge of tying in this context by arguing a "single product" defense - the
franchise and its location are of unitary business significance.
The appropriateness of a Parke, Davis thrust as explicated above, as with
areas of primary responsibility, depends upon the activities of the dealers in
relation to those of the manufacturer in policing the arrangement and the na-

242.
243.
244.

Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 339 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
124 F.2d 822, rehearingdenied, 130 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1942).

245. Jordan, supra note 185, at 146.
246. 124 F.2d at 823.

247. See discussion note 80 et seq. supra.
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ture of the restraint. If the location clause were to emphasize the dealer's
proper business attention to the area surrounding his location rather than the
boundaries that were not to be transgressed, it would probably be held valid.
2 48
Such a result can be contrasted with United States v. General Motors Corp.,
which presented an issue to which the Court could have applied a Parke,
Davis analysis and decided the case on "classical conspiracy" grounds..249 In
General Motors the Court found a causal connection between the refusal to
deal and the alleged conspiracy between General Motors and some of its
dealers. It was directly through the refusals to deal that the illegal results of
the conspiracy were accomplished; namely, maintaining minimum automobile
prices by refusing to sell to discount outlets.
Again, the franchisor must proceed with caution, but if his demands are
unilateral or based on business demands in the context of the latter two less
restrictive restraints, his action will probably escape antitrust condemnation.
TERMINATION

Termination of the franchise relationship, usually occurring in the form
of a refusal to deal, is an area of significant concern in antitrust law.250 As
discussed above,2 5 1 in United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 25 2 the Supreme
Court emphasized the ease with which courts may interpret a seemingly unilateral refusal to deal as a conspiracy within the ambit of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The significant impact of this theory of Parke, Davis has been
evidenced by the continued reliance of the courts upon it.223
There are, of course, some legitimate and justifiable unilateral refusals
to deal. For example, the courts have upheld terminations brought about in
order to preserve a policy of selling only to wholesalers. - 4 Similarly dissatisfaction with the business performance of a franchisee, 252 and protection of
goodwill 256 have been recognized as proper grounds for refusals to deal.

248.

384 U.S. 127 (1966).

249. Id. at 139-40; Jones, supra note 197, at 730. See also Osborn v. Sinclair Refining
Co., 324 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1963).
250. Termination can become significant as a factor in forms of antitrust violations
other than refusals to deal. The Supreme Court's condemnation of the "quasi-tying"
arrangements in FTC v. Texaco, 393 U.S. 223 (1968) (without explicitly terming them
tying arrangements, the Court noted the similarity of their economic consequences to those
of more traditional tying arrangements) was based largely on the coercive nature inherent
in the power to terminate the franchising arrangement. See discussion note 90 et seq. supra.
251. See text accompanying note 208 et seq. supra.
252.

362 U.S. 29 (1960).

253. Cf. Broussard v. Socony Mobile Oil Co., 350 F.2d 346, 349 n.5 (5th Cir. 1965);
Wulzberg Bros., Inc. v. Head Ski Co., 276 F. Supp. 142 (D.N.J. 1967).
254. Great Atlantic 8: Pac. Tea Co. v. Cream of Wheat Co., 227 F. 46 (2d Cir. 1915).
See also Brosious v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 155 F.2d 99 (3d Cir. 1945); E.A. Weinel Constr. Co. v.
Mueller Co., 289 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. IlL. 1968).
255. Ampex of Md., Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 380 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1967); Hudson
Sales Corp. v. Waldrip, 211 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954).
256. Coca-Cola v. J.G. Butler & Sons, 229 F. 224 (E.D. Ark. 1916).
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The principal problem in the area of franchising arises largely from the
appreciation of value of the franchise resulting from both the efforts of the
franchisor and franchisee.2 57 The loss of a considerable investment in establishing and maintaining the goodwill of the franchised operation may occur
upon termination. The Court in Texaco noted this explicitly: "The average
dealer is a man of limited means who has what is for him a sizeable investment in his station. He stands to lose much if he incurs the ill will of Texaco." 258 Largely because of the inequality of bargaining power existing between
the franchisor and franchisee in most situations, this loss may occur as a
result of rather insignificant actions of the franchisee. Such actions probably
would not lead to termination among equals. Congress was made aware of
such a problem in the automobile industry259 and enacted statutory protection
for the franchised automobile dealers.2 6 0 Although considerable doubt has
been raised concerning the protection afforded franchised automobile dealers
under the act, 2 61 broader legislation contemplating protection of franchisees
262
in general has been proposed.
Mr. Rufus Wilson of the Federal Trade Commission has suggested further
protection for the franchisee. Mr. Wilson argues that a franchisee might be
able to argue "unconscionability" upon franchise termination in the absence
of good cause on the part of the franchisor. Such a tactic, he asserts, would be
2 62
Yet
but a short step from section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.
this theory, as well as the proposed legislation, remains speculative. The real
threat to the franchisor in the area of termination is that enunciated by
26
Parke,Davis. '
CONCLUSION
265
the Supreme Court noted that
In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn Se Co.
part of the company's purpose in restricting the territories and customers to
whom the distributor could sell was to keep Schwinn bicycles out of discount
houses.2 66 As one commentator has pointed out, Schwinn did not merely appoint preferred dealers, but demanded that its bicycles be sold only through
those dealers.2 67 The question is why Schwinn felt it was necessary to keep
its products out of the hands of discount dealers. Prestige is obviously in-

257. Covey, Franchisingand the Antitrust Laws: Panacea or Problem?, 42 NoTRE DAME
LAW. 605, 612-13 (1967).
258. 393 U.S. 223, 227, 89 S. Ct. 429, 432 (1968).
259. H.R. REP. No. 2850, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956).
260. Automobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §1221, et seq. (1964).
261. Freed, Study of Dealers Suits Under the Automobile Dealers Franchise Act, 41 U.
DEr. Lj. 245 (1964). See, e.g., Mt. Lebanon Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp.
453 (W.D. Pa. 1968).
262. BNA ANmrrusr & TRADE REG. REP., Jan. 28, 1969, at A-11, A-12.
263. BNA ANTrrausr & TRADE REc. REP., Feb. 18, 1969, at A-7.
264. See Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 r. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
265. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
266. Id. at 376-77.
267. Pollock, supra note 221, at 599.
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volved, but most companies, having fought against discount merchandising
of their products for years, have now discovered that they do a large and
valuable share of business through discount houses. 26 8 Several commentators
have noted that the manufacturers who still resist such marketing falter when
asked for a solid economic rationale for their resistance.269 The Federal Trade
Commission has begun to emphasize achievement of the legitimate benefits
of control through the least restrictive practices available.270 An advisory
opinion as to certain requirements contracts in a franchise operation empha271
sized the impact of a less restrictive device on the arrangement's legality:

[A]s to those products where uniformity might be necessary, we cannot
determine whether it could not be achieved by specifications or by some
other less restrictive means than that provided for .

. .

. Accordingly,

we cannot give you any opinion as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of
this provision.
The burden is clearly on the franchisor to assure that he implements a
nonrestrictive practice, for if the Federal Trade Commission finds later that
his legitimate interests could have been achieved through less restrictive means,
he may find his practices subject to attack. Accordingly, after a careful legal
analysis of what is and what is not permissible under the antitrust laws, one
might be wise, in view of the rapidity with which standards of legality in
the antitrust field have changed in the last few years, 27 2 to look not to the
boundary of legality but to seek out the least restrictive practice that will
accomplish the desired result.27 3 In the last analysis, the franchisor must shift
his emphasis from what may be done under a strict interpretation of the relevant statutes and case law to a balancing of his need for control over the
franchisee with society's need to protect the status of the small, independent
businessman.
PHILIP W. DANN
THOMAs B. HYMAN, JR.

268. Dillon, supra note 241, at 154-55.
269. Zeidman, Small Business Concerns-Franchisingand Its Antitrust Problems, 29
ALA. LAW. 460, 481 (1968).
270. Id. at 475, quoting Donald F. Turner, then Assistant Attorney General for the
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice.
271. FTC Adv. Op. Digest No. 19, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH TRADE REc. REP.
1117,471 (March 23, 1966).
272. Compare White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), with United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn &Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
273. Dillon, supra note 241, at 155.
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